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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case involves an interpretation of the sentencing 
guidelines. The issue on appeal before the en banc court is 
the continuing vitality of our opinion in United States v. 
Rosen, 896 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1990), addressing S 5K2.13 of 
the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines 
Manual (Nov. 1997) which permits a downward departure 
based on diminished capacity where the crime is non- 
violent. The specific issue requires us to examine the 
meaning of "non-violent" offense under the sentencing 
guidelines. 
 
Although resolution of this case would not necessarily 
compel reexamination of Rosen, much has been written by 
other courts of appeals since our decision eight years ago. 
The en banc court affords us the opportunity to revisit the 
issue and modify our views. 
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I. 
 
A. 
 
Muhammad Askari appeals his sentence for bank 
robbery under 18 U.S.C.A. S 2113(a) (West Supp. 1997), 
contending the district court should have granted him a 
downward departure for diminished capacity under USSG 
S 5K2.13 because (1) the unarmed bank robbery was non- 
violent and (2) he has a well-documented history of serious 
psychiatric illness. 
 
Askari's mental illness at the time he committed the bank 
robbery is not at issue. Indeed, before sentencing, the 
district court found that Askari was not mentally competent 
and committed him, under 18 U.S.C. S 4244(d), to a federal 
institution for psychiatric care and treatment.1 After the 
warden at the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at 
Springfield, Missouri certified that Askari had recovered 
and was again mentally competent, the court sentenced 
him to 210 months in prison. (See App. at 58a, 68a).2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Dr. Edward Guy examined Askari to assess whether he was competent 
to stand trial. Dr. Guy initially concluded that Askari was suffering from 
paranoid schizophrenia in partial remission, drug addiction, and seizure 
disorder, but he concluded that Askari was competent to stand trial. 
Following a second psychiatric evaluation before Askari's sentencing, Dr. 
Guy testified that Askari was not competent. Noting Askari's "history of 
serious mental illness," Dr. Guy found that Askari was too delusional to 
be able to cooperate with his attorney. The district court then ordered 
Askari's commitment. After two years of treatment at the U.S. Medical 
Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, Askari was 
diagnosed as suffering from "Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type currently in 
remission with antipsychotic medication." The report noted that Askari 
initially "exhibited delusional thinking and auditory hallucinations," 
which improved with medication. The report concluded that Askari was 
now competent. (See App. at 62a-67a, 68a). 
 
2. Askari qualified as "a career offender in that he was at least 18 years 
old at the time of the instant offense, the instant offense [was] a felony 
involving violence and the defendant [had] at least two prior felony 
convictions for crimes of violence." Presentence Report P 33. (See App. at 
56a (district court noting, during sentencing, Askari "has a long history 
of crime including violent crime . . . . the criminal history score in 
this 
case takes him pretty much to the top of the range" but concluding 
"[b]ecause I am satisfied that the low end of the sentencing range will 
provide a sufficient deterrent and punishment I am going to sentence 
him at the bottom of the range with the discretion I have")). 
 
                                3 
  
The facts regarding the bank robbery are not in dispute. 
On the afternoon of April 23, 1992, Askari entered the First 
Bank of Philadelphia at 1424 Walnut Street in Philadelphia. 
He approached a closed teller's window and said two or 
three times, "Put the money on the counter." Then, he went 
to an open window and told the bank teller, Ellen Ishizaki, 
"You have three seconds to give me the money." After 
Ishizaki gave him bait money, he ran out the door. Askari 
was not seen carrying a weapon, nor did he use force or 
make specific verbal threats of harm. When he demanded 
money from bank teller Ishizaki, however, he had his hand 
underneath his shirt. Two bank employees along with a 
Center City Special District employee chased Askari and 
caught him two blocks away. Police later found the bait 
money in Askari's pants. They did not recover a weapon. 
(See Presentence Report PP 5-8). 
 
Askari was indicted for bank robbery, and, on July 10, 
1992, was found guilty by a jury. At sentencing, defense 
counsel argued for a downward departure based on Askari's 
diminished mental capacity, citing his history of serious 
psychiatric illness and his diagnosis as a paranoid 
schizophrenic. The district court declined to grant the 
departure, explaining that the sentencing guidelines 
"contain a policy statement that a downward departure for 
diminished capacity is limited to non[-]violent offenses . . . . 
[the] commission says [there is] no downward departure for 
diminished capacity at the time of the offense, if the offense 
is a violent crime." (App. at 45a). The court also rejected 
defendant's motion for downward departure based on 
unusual, mitigating circumstances not adequately 
considered by the guidelines.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See USSG S 5K2.0, p.s. (permitting the imposition of a sentence 
outside the range established by the guideline "if the court finds `that 
there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described' "). 
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B. 
 
Askari appealed his sentence, contending the unarmed 
bank robbery was a non-violent offense because he did not 
use force or violence, or verbally threaten or harm anyone 
during the robbery. A panel of our court rejected Askari's 
arguments and affirmed the district court: 
 
       In United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 
       1990), we held that the district court did not have the 
       authority in a bank robbery sentence to depart 
       downward because that offense is not a `non-violent' 
       offense. We so concluded by looking to a separate 
       guidelines provision, [USSG] S 4B1.2, which defines 
       robbery as a `crime of violence.' Although the circuits 
       are split on this point, we are bound by our prior 
       holding. 
 
United States v. Askari, No. 95-1662, 1997 WL 92051, at *2 
(3d Cir. Mar. 5, 1997), Order Vacating Opinion and Granting 
Rehearing En Banc, Mar. 27, 1997. 
 
Nonetheless, we recognized disagreement among the 
courts of appeals whether the "crime of violence" definition 
contained in USSG S 4B1.24 governs the "non-violent" 
offense requirement of USSG S 5K2.13: 
 
        Four other circuits have reached the same 
       conclusion that this court reached in Rosen. United 
       States v. Mayotte, 76 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir. 1996); 
       United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591-93 (7th Cir. 
       1991) (en banc) (6-5 decision); United States v. 
       Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989); United 
       States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1989). 
       However, two circuits, following Judge Easterbrook's 
       dissent in Poff, have concluded that the "non-violent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. USSG S 4B1.1 enhances the offense level for "career offenders." See 
USSG S 4B1.1, comment. (backg'd.) (28 U.S.C.S 994(h) "mandates that 
the Commission assure that certain `career' offenders receive a sentence 
of imprisonment `at or near the maximum term authorized.' " USSG 
S 4B1.1 implements this directive by employing a definition of career 
offender that tracks in large part the criteria set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
S 994(h)). USSG S 4B1.2 provides definitions for terms used in USSG 
S 4B1.1, including "crime of violence." 
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       offense" requirement of S 5K2.13 is not governed by the 
       "crime of violence" definition contained inS 4B1.2. 
       United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 
       1994); United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 
       (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 
Askari, 1997 WL 92051, at *2 n.2. 
 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Becker, recognizing our 
controlling precedent in Rosen, suggested "that our decision 
in Rosen, that a downward departure is not available under 
S 5K2.13 of the sentencing guidelines in relation to a crime, 
the commission of which involves no violence in fact, is 
incorrect and should be reconsidered by the Court en 
banc." Askari, 1997 WL 92051, at *2 (Becker, J., 
concurring). According to Judge Becker: 
 
       While `crimes of violence' and `non-violent offense' 
       employ the same root word, the phrases `readily may 
       take meanings other than as opposites.' More 
       importantly, the distinct objectives of the two 
       provisions at issue -- S 4B1.2 and S 5K2.13 -- counsel 
       that the meaning of the former not govern that of the 
       latter. 
 
* * * 
 
        In short, some factors at work in the departure 
       sections of the Guidelines are in tension with those at 
       work under the career offender sections, and it does 
       not make sense to import a career offender-based 
       definition of `crime of violence' into a departure section 
       in the absence of specific cross-reference. Rather, it is 
       better to permit the district courts to consider all the 
       facts and circumstances surrounding the commission 
       of a crime when deciding whether it qualifies as a non- 
       violent offense under S 5K2.13. 
 
Id. at *4-6 (citations omitted). We vacated our panel 
decision in Askari for reconsideration en banc. 
 
II. 
 
The able district judge, following our decision in United 
States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1990), determined 
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that he lacked authority to depart downward.5 We review 
for "abuse of discretion." See United States v. Sally, 116 
F.3d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1997). By definition, a district court 
"abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. That 
a departure decision, in an occasional case, may call for a 
legal determination does not mean, as a consequence, that 
parts of the review must be labeled de novo while other 
parts are labeled an abuse of discretion." Koon v. United 
States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047-48 (1996) (citations omitted). 
"The abuse of discretion standard includes review to 
determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous 
legal conclusions." Id. at 2048. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
1. 
 
USSG S 5K2.13, a policy statement permitting downward 
departures,6 provides: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See App. at 45a ("I cannot depart downward for diminished capacity 
at the time of the offense based on the guidelines as I read them. They 
at least contain a policy statement that a downward departure for 
diminished capacity is limited to non[-]violent offenses"). 
 
6. "The Guideline Manual contains three [types] of text: guidelines 
provisions, policy statements and commentary." United States v. 
Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 624 (3d Cir. 1995). "When a crime is covered by 
the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentence is computed based not only on 
the relevant guidelines, but also on the Sentencing Commission's policy 
statements and commentary." United States v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 279, 
281 (3d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 
1384, 1404-05 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 
The Supreme Court has stated "[t]he principle that the Guidelines 
Manual is binding on federal courts applies as well to policy statements." 
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42 (1993). "Furthermore, where `a 
policy statement prohibits a district court from taking a specified 
action, 
the statement is an authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable 
guideline.' " Corrado, 53 F.3d at 624 (citing Williams v. United States, 
503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992); United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1424 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1994)). See, e.g., United States v. Brannan, 74 F.3d 448, 454 
n.9 (3d Cir. 1996) ("both the Policy Statements and the Commentary in 
the Sentencing Guidelines are binding on the federal courts") (citation 
omitted). 
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        If the defendant committed a non-violent offense 
       while suffering from significantly reduced mental 
       capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or 
       other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted 
       to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity 
       contributed to the commission of the offense, provided 
       that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a 
       need for incarceration to protect the public. 
 
USSG S 5K2.13, p.s. (emphasis supplied). 
 
"Non-violent offense" is not defined in either USSG 
S 5K2.13 or the commentary.7 But the term "crime of 
violence" is defined in the "career offender" provisions of 
Chapter 4.8 USSG S 4B1.1 enhances the offense level for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The sentencing guidelines describe departures: 
 
       The sentencing statute permits a court to depart from a guideline- 
       specified sentence only when it finds `an aggravating or mitigating 
       circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
       consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
       guidelines that should result in a sentence different than that 
       described.' 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b). The Commission intends the 
       sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a 
       `heartland,' a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each 
       guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to 
       which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where 
conduct 
       significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether 
       a departure is warranted. 
 
USSG Ch. 3, Pt. A, intro. comment. 
 
8. Chapter 4 of the sentencing guidelines addresses criminal history: 
 
        The Comprehensive Crime Control Act sets forth four purposes of 
       sentencing. (See 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(2).) A defendant's record of 
past 
       criminal conduct is directly relevant to those purposes. A 
defendant 
       with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a 
first 
       offender and thus deserving of greater punishment. General 
       deterence of criminal behavior will aggravate the need for 
       punishment with each recurrence. To protect the public from further 
       crimes of the particular defendant, the likelihood of recidivism 
and 
       future criminal behavior must be considered. Repeated criminal 
       behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful 
       rehabilitation. 
 USSG Ch.4, Pt. A, intro. comment. 
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career offenders, and USSG S 4B1.2 provides definitions for 
terms used in USSG S 4B1.1, including "crime of violence": 
 
       The term `crime of violence' means any offense under 
       federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a 
       term exceeding one year, that -- 
 
       (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
       threatened use of physical force against the person 
       of another, or 
 
       (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, 
       involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 
       conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
       physical injury to another. 
 
USSG S 4B1.2(a). 
 
An accompanying application note expands on this 
definition with concrete examples: 
 
       `Crime of violence' includes murder, manslaughter, 
       kidnaping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, 
       robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of 
       credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are 
       included as `crimes of violence' if (A) that offense has 
       an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
       physical force against the person of another, or (B) the 
       conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count 
       of which the defendant was convicted involved use of 
       explosives (including any explosive material or 
       destructive device) or, by its nature, presented a 
       serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 
 
       `Crime of violence' does not include the offense of 
       unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. 
 
USSG S 4B1.1, comment. (n.1) (emphasis supplied).9 If 
"non-violent" offense in USSG S 5K2.13 is defined by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. While USSG S 5K2.13 is a policy statement, the specific definitions of 
"crime of violence" that accompany USSG S 4B1.2 in the application 
notes are "commentary." See United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 
731 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Commentary in the guidelines is binding unless it 
runs afoul of the Constitution or a federal statute, or is plainly 
erroneous 
or inconsistent with the section of the guidelines it purports to 
interpret") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2413 (1997). 
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reference to the term "crime of violence" in USSG S 4B1.2 
and its commentary, then bank robbery would never qualify 
as a "non-violent" offense.  
 
The general application principles articulated in the 
Introduction to the sentencing guidelines supply a list of 
definitions "that are used frequently in the guidelines and 
are of general applicability (except to the extent expressly 
modified in respect to a particular guideline or policy 
statement)." USSG S 1B1.1, comment. (n.2). But, "non- 
violent offense" and "crime of violence" do not appear in 
this list of definitions. The Introduction also dictates that 
"[d]efinitions of terms also may appear in other sections. 
Such definitions are not designed for general applicability; 
therefore, their applicability to sections other than those 
expressly referenced must be determined on a case by case 
basis." USSG S 1B1.1, comment. (n.2). 
 
2. 
 
Askari was convicted of bank robbery in violation of 18 
U.S.C.A. S 2113(a): 
 
       [w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, 
       takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence 
       of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by 
       extortion any property or money or any other thing of 
       value belonging to, or in the case, custody, control, 
       management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, 
       or any savings and loan association. 
 
"The requirement that property be taken either`by force 
and violence' or `by intimidation' requires proof of force or 
threat of force as an element of the offense." United States 
v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 
In determining whether intimidation is present, an 
objective standard is employed from the perspective of the 
victim, i.e., "whether `an ordinary person in the teller's 
position reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm from 
the defendant's acts.' " United States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 
359, 363 (4th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. 
Ct. 332 (1996). 
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       As used in S 2113(a), the term `intimidation' means `to 
       make fearful or put into fear.' 
 
        The Government is not required to show either an 
       `express verbal threat or threatening display of a 
       weapon.' Actual fear need not be proven, if the acts of 
       the defendant would threaten an ordinary reasonable 
       person. Thus, the government need show only that an 
       ordinary person in the teller's position would feel a 
       threat of bodily harm from the perpetrator's acts.  
 
United McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349, 1357 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(citations omitted). See also Maddalena, 893 F.2d at 819 
(same). 
 
The district court sentenced Askari under USSG S 2B3.1 
("Robbery, Extortion, Blackmail") which punishes, inter alia, 
robbery of the property of a financial institution. USSG 
S 2B3.1 does not define the term "non-violent" offense, 
perhaps because the crime of robbery contemplates at least 
some force, threat of force, or intimidation. While USSG 
S 2B3.1 provides for a guideline increase if a death threat 
was made, it is silent on the threat of bodily harm.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. USSG S 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) calls for an increase of 2 levels "if a threat 
of 
death was made." 
 
       `threat of death' . . . may be in the form of an oral or written 
       statement, act, gesture, or combination thereof. Accordingly, the 
       defendant does not have to state expressly his intent to kill the 
       victim in order for the enhancement to apply. For example, an oral 
       or written demand using words such as `Give me the money or I will 
       kill you,' `Give me the money or I will pull the pin on the grenade 
I 
       have in my pocket,' `Give me the money or I will shoot you,' `Give 
me 
       the money or else (where the defendant draws his hand across his 
       throat in a slashing motion),' or `Give me the money or you are 
dead' 
       would constitute a threat of death. The court should consider that 
       the intent of this provision is to provide an increased offense 
level 
       for cases in which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that would 
       instill in a reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, a 
fear 
       of death. 
 
USSG S 2B3.1, comment. (n.6). 
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B. 
 
Against this backdrop we examine the conflict among 
several courts of appeals interpreting "non-violent offense" 
in USSG S 5K2.13. The discussion has centered on whether 
a sentencing judge must categorically adopt the"crime of 
violence" definition in USSG S 4B1.2 or whether the judge 
has discretion to look to the facts and circumstances in 
each case. 
 
1. 
 
In Rosen, the defendant pled guilty to sending a 
threatening communication through the mail to extort 
money through threat of injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 876. Defendant, an admitted compulsive gambler, wrote 
checks from a home equity credit line to satisfy growing 
gambling losses. Unable to make payment, he sent letters 
to three acquaintances representing that, unless money 
was received, their relatives would be harmed. 
 
At sentencing, defendant presented expert testimony 
about his compulsive gambling and argued that he neither 
intended nor had the capability to carry out the threats 
made in the letters. Sentencing the defendant under USSG 
S 2B3.2 ("Extortion by Force or Threat of Injury or Serious 
Damage"), the district court determined that defendant's 
compulsive gambling did not constitute a mitigating factor 
justifying departure below the guideline minimum. 
 
On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, the district 
court incorrectly refused to apply USSG S 5K2.13 because 
his crime was non-violent, i.e., it did not involve physical 
force. We disagreed: 
 
       Crimes of violence, however, include situations where 
       force is threatened but not used. In other contexts, 
       crimes of violence have been defined as offenses that 
       have `as an element the use, attempted use, or 
       threatened use of physical force.' 18 U.S.C. S 61 (1988) 
       . . . see U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2, comment. (n.1). Defendant 
       would have us conclude that S 5K2.13's use of the term 
       `non-violent' means something other than the opposite 
       of a crime of violence. 
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        We can find no support for such a contention and 
       therefore find no error in the district court's 
       determination that defendant's crime was not `non- 
       violent.' See United States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91 (9th 
       Cir. 1989); cf. United States v. Poff, 723 F. Supp. 79 
       (N.D. Ind. 1989). Consequently, guideline S 5K2.13 
       does not authorize a downward departure for this 
       defendant's mental condition. 
 
Rosen, 896 F.2d at 791. We looked to the "crime of 
violence" definition contained in USSG S 4B1.2 to determine 
whether the defendant was entitled to a downward 
departure in USSG S 5K2.13 for "non-violent offenses." 
Because defendant's crime constituted a "crime of violence," 
we found USSG S 5K2.13 inapplicable. 
 
As recently as this year, we have cited Rosen. See United 
States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 542 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The 
basis for our holding in Rosen was that the definition of 
`crime of violence' contained in section 4B1.2, which is the 
career offender provision, governs the meaning of`non- 
violent' offense in section 5K2.13 . . . . we are[bound] by 
our decision in Rosen, 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1"). 
 
2. 
 
As we have noted, the question of whether "non-violent 
offense" in USSG S 5K2.13 may be defined by reference to 
"crime of violence" in USSG S 4B1.2 has been answered 
differently by the different courts of appeals. Five other 
circuits are in accord with Rosen. See United States v. 
Mayotte, 76 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The phrase 
`non-violent offense' is not defined in the guidelines. 
However, the term `crime of violence' is defined in Section 
4B1.2 of the sentencing guidelines. We believe that a `non- 
violent offense' necessarily excludes `crime of violence' "); 
United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 
1994) ("downward departure was not permissible for 
reduced mental capacity under U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 after 
Dailey was convicted of a `crime of violence' "); United States 
v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) ("We have 
defined `non-violent' as the converse of a `crime of violence' 
under U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2(1)(I)"); United States v. Maddalena, 
 
                                13 
  
893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989) ("the commentary to 
section 4B1.2 of the guidelines includes robbery as an 
offense covered by the provision . . . . Thus section 5K2.13 
is not applicable to defendant, for he did not commit a non- 
violent offense"); United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591 
(7th Cir. 1990) ("We decline to adopt [the defendant's] 
argument that rests on the premise that the Guidelines 
define the same act as both a `crime of violence' and a `non- 
violent' offense") (citation omitted) (en banc) (6-5 decision), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991). 
 
Two courts of appeals have embraced the view that the 
district court's discretion to depart downward under USSG 
S 5K2.13 should not be restricted by USSG S 4B1.2. See 
United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994) 
("the Sentencing Commission did not intend to import [the 
`crime of violence' definition] from [USSG S 4B1.2 to USSG 
S 5K2.13]"). See also United States v. Morin, 124 F.3d 649, 
653 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Although a definition of crimes of 
violence is found elsewhere in the guidelines, we have held 
that the definition of `crime of violence' in S 4B1.2 of the 
sentencing guidelines (regarding career offenders) is not 
applicable to S 5K2.13 and its reference to`non-violent' 
offense"); United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1450 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) ("we are not persuaded that section 4B1.2 
should govern the application of section 5K2.13. Rather, we 
believe that the sentencing court has broad discretion 
under section 5K2.13 to examine all the facts and 
circumstances of a case to determine whether a particular 
offense was in fact `non-violent' "). 
 
In addition, five dissenting judges in the Poff decision 
share the same view. Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 ("different terms 
in a carefully drafted code such as the guidelines connote 
different things . . . `non-violent' offense refers to crimes 
that in the event did not entail violence. When prison is not 
justified by the need to incapacitate the defendant, 
S 5K2.13 is available") (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Review 
of Poff and Chatman illustrates the distinctions. See 
Weddle, 30 F.3d at 538 ("The Seventh Circuit's Poff 
decision and the D.C. Circuit's Chatman decision provide 
the only detailed analyses of the issue presented"). 
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3. 
 
The Poff majority provides an elaborate argument in favor 
of the first view -- that USSG S 4B1.2's "crime of violence" 
definition controls USSG S 5K2.13's "non-violent offense" 
requirement. First, the Poff majority emphasized the 
similarity between the two phrases: 
 
        Courts often say that the choice of different words 
       reflects an intent to say something different. But here 
       the Commission used the same word -- `violence.' 
       True, in one case it used a negative construction-- 
       `non-violent' -- and in the other case used a 
       prepositional phrase containing the noun `violence' as 
       a modifier rather than using the simpler adjective 
       `violent' -- but the root, and meaning, are the same in 
       both cases . . . . The Guidelines should be read as a 
       whole, S 1B1.1(I), and when the same word appears in 
       different, though related sections, that word likely 
       bears the same meaning in both instances. 
 
Poff, 926 F.2d at 591 (citations omitted). 
 
The Poff majority then looked to the Armed Career 
Offender provision of 18 U.S.C.A. S 924(e)(2)(B)(I) (West 
Supp. 1997) where Congress defined "violent felony" to 
include any crime that, inter alia, "has as an element of the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against another," believing that definition mirrored USSG 
S 4B1.2's "crime of violence." The Poff majority reasoned: 
"[i]f it is difficult to discern a difference between `violent 
offense' and `crime of violence,' it is well nigh impossible to 
divine any distinction between a `violent felony' and a 
`violent offense.' " Id. at 592. 
 
According to the Poff majority, if the Sentencing 
Commission wanted to differentiate between different types 
of violence, it would have expressly included an alternative 
definition in USSG S 5K2.13: 
 
        We think it likely that had the Commission desired to 
       distinguish among types of violence, it would have 
       expanded its vocabulary. At a minimum, it would have 
       offered a technical definition for each term. Perhaps a 
       cross-reference between the two sections would have 
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       eliminated any possibility of confusion, but hindsight is 
       a demanding critic. It is hardly surprising that the 
       Commission failed to foresee the argument that a crime 
       of violence can, under the same sentencing scheme, 
       also be a non-violent offense. 
 
       * * * 
 
        Even if we believed that the Commission intended to 
       define violence differently in S 5K2.13, we could do little 
       but guess as to its meaning. 
 
Id. at 592 (citations omitted). 
 
Looking to the underlying objectives of the two provisions 
at issue, the Poff majority stated: 
 
       The Guidelines reflect the view that those who have a 
       history of crimes of violence merit increased 
       incarceration, and include those, like appellant, who 
       have threatened violence in that category of 
       defendants. In addition to limiting the authority of 
       courts to decrease the sentences of defendants with 
       reduced mental capacity to cases in which the 
       defendant committed a non-violent offense, S 5K2.13 
       further circumscribed the authority of courts to depart 
       on this basis by adding the proviso that `the 
       defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need 
       for incarceration to protect the public.' Career 
       offenders, by definition, fail to meet this condition . . . . 
       So even if the terms `non-violent offense' and`crime of 
       violence' were not mutually exclusive, S 5K2.13 would 
       not have authorized the district court to depart. 
 
* * * 
 
       Because those suffering mental incapacities are 
       effectively less deterrable (making the need for 
       incapacitation greater), it would not be unreasonable to 
       assume that the Commission believed departures to be 
       warranted only when there is little prospect that such 
       a defendant will manifest any form of violent behavior. 
       That this reading would not subvert the purpose of 
       S 4B1.1 is a point that further commends it. 
 
Id. at 592-93 (citations omitted). The Poff majority view still 
holds in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
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Circuit. See United States v. Sullivan, 75 F.3d 297, 300 (7th 
Cir. 1996) ("this panel is bound by the en banc decision in 
Poff and thus we affirm the district court's denial of a 
downward departure under S 5K2.13"). 
 
4. 
 
The arguments of the Poff majority were countered by 
Judge Easterbrook, who authored the dissenting opinion. 
Both Chatman from the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit and Weddle from the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit adopted and expanded upon the 
rationale articulated in the Poff dissent. We outline the 
principal arguments set forth by the Poff dissent and the 
Chatman and Weddle decisions here. 
 
Starting with the text of USSG S 5K2.13, these decisions 
note that "[n]othing in the Guidelines themselves or in the 
Application Notes suggests that section 4B1.2 is meant to 
control the interpretation and application of section 
5K2.13." Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450. The omission from 
USSG S 5K2.13 of either the phrase "crime of violence" or a 
cross-reference was intentional: 
 
       It would have been easy to write S 5K2.13 to say that 
       the judge may depart unless the defendant committed 
       a `crime of violence' as S 4B1.2 defines it; instead, the 
       Commission selected different formulations. Although 
       it laid out a detailed meaning for `crime of violence' in 
       S 4B1.2, it did not provide so much as a cross- 
       reference in S 5K2.13, a curious omission if the 
       Commission meant to link these phrases so tightly that 
       they are mutually exclusive. 
 
Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). See 
Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450 ("The lack of a cross-reference 
is all the more significant because so many of the 
Guidelines use explicit cross-referencing"). 
 
While the sentencing guidelines have been frequently 
amended, these decisions observe that the Sentencing 
Commission has never altered USSG S 5K2.13 to 
specifically incorporate the "crime of violence" definition. 
See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450 ("Moreover, the 
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Commission has amended section 4B1.2 and its 
commentary twice in the last two years, and neither time 
did the Commission suggest any relationship between 
section 5K2.13 and section 4B1.2") (citing Poff, 926 F.2d at 
594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). 
 
Despite the common root word shared by "crime of 
violence" and "non-violent offense," the phrases may take 
meanings other than as opposites: 
 
       As the Commission was at pains to establish in 
       S 4B1.2, whether a crime is one `of violence' depends 
       on its elements and not on the defendant's conduct, so 
       that an unrealized prospect of violence makes the 
       crime one of violence. This is an abnormal sense, a 
       term of art. It took a detailed definition to make it so. 
       Then comes S 5K2.13, in which `non-violent offense' 
       appears without elaboration or cross reference. Best to 
       read these words in their ordinary sense rather than as 
       tied to the term of art in S 4B1.2. A `non-violent offense' 
       in ordinary legal (and lay) understanding is one in 
       which mayhem did not occur. The prospect of violence 
       . . . sets the presumptive range; when things turn out 
       better than they might, departure is permissible. 
 
Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 
Furthermore, these sections address different concerns. 
USSG S 4B1.1 prescribes a formula to determine whether a 
defendant is a "career offender" who warrants increased 
incarceration because of an extensive criminal history. 
 
       In section 994(h), Congress directed the Commission to 
       ensure that the Guidelines specify prison sentences 
       that are `at or near the maximum term authorized' for 
       `career offenders,' which include those who have`been 
       convicted of a felony that is either a crime of violence 
       or a drug offense and who have been previously 
       convicted of two felonies where each has either a crime 
       of violence or a drug offense.' Longer sentences for 
       such offenders are justified by the purposes of 
       incarceration, as set out in 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(2) . . . . 
       [They] guarantee incapacitation of those repeat 
       offenders whose past records suggest a propensity to 
       commit violent crimes. 
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        Reflecting these policy concerns, the definition of 
       `crime of violence' in section 4B1.2 is distinctively a 
       `term of art' designed to identify career offenders . . . . 
       section 4B1.2 appears to characterize as `crimes of 
       violence' many offenses that, taken individually on 
       their facts, might be interpreted as non-violent. 
 
Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1451 (citations omitted). By contrast, 
USSG S 5K2.13 encourages more lenient treatment: 
 
       the policy concerns that motivate the definition of 
       `crime of violence' in section 4B1.2 are not applicable to 
       section 5K2.13 . . . . [the purpose of which] is to treat 
       with lenity those individuals whose `reduced mental 
       capacity' contributed to the commission of a crime. 
 
* * * 
 
        Considered in this context, the term `non-violent 
       offense' in section 5K2.13 refers to those offenses that, 
       in the act, reveal that a defendant is not dangerous, 
       and therefore need not be incapacitated for the period 
       of time the Guidelines would otherwise recommend. 
 
Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1451-52 (citations omitted). See 
Weddle, 30 F.3d at 540 ("U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13 is intended to 
create lenity for those who cannot control their actions but 
are actually dangerous; U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2 is intended to 
treat harshly the career criminal, whether or not their 
actual crime is in fact violent"); Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 ("A 
hefty sentence may be appropriate simply because it 
incapacitates and so reduces the likelihood of further 
offenses. When the described person's conduct is non- 
violent, however, incapacitation is less important .. . . 
Because legal sanctions are less effective with persons 
suffering from mental abnormalities, a system of 
punishment based on deterrence also curtails sanction") 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 
This approach allows the district judge to make a fact- 
specific inquiry not governed by the "crime of violence" 
definition of USSG S 4B1.2. See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450 
("we are not persuaded that section 4B1.2 should govern 
the application of section 5K2.13. Rather . . . the 
sentencing court has broad discretion under section 5K2.13 
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to examine all the facts and circumstances of a case to 
determine whether a particular offense was in fact`non- 
violent' ").11 
 
C. 
 
As noted, the en banc court enables us to examine again 
the language, structure, and purpose of the sentencing 
guidelines and to appraise again the definition of"non- 
violent offense" in USSG S 5K2.13. Although our initial view 
set forth in Rosen was a reasoned interpretation that now 
represents the view of most courts of appeals, we now 
believe the analysis of the relationship between USSG 
S 5K2.13 and USSG S 4B1.2 articulated by the dissent in 
Poff and later developed in Chatman and Weddle is more 
convincing. 
 
Without detailing those arguments already set forth, we 
find especially compelling the following observations. First, 
USSG S 5K2.13 contains no cross-reference to USSG 
S 4B1.2's definition of "crime of violence." Even though the 
Sentencing Commission has amended the sentencing 
guidelines over five-hundred times in the last nine years, it 
has made no cross-reference in USSG S 5K2.13 linking 
"non-violent offense" to the "crime of violence" definition in 
S 4B1.2. 
 
Second, by limiting USSG S 5K2.13 to those defendants 
whose "criminal history does not indicate a need for 
incarceration to protect the public," the Sentencing 
Commission removed the USSG S 5K2.13 departure from 
the reach of "career offenders." Having done so, it makes 
little sense to import a definition of "non-violent offense" 
from the section on career offenders. 
 
Third, USSG S 1B1.1 articulates a list of definitions of 
general applicability which includes neither "crime of 
violence" nor "non-violent" offense. That provision specifies: 
"[d]efinitions . . . [which] appear in other sections . . . . are 
not designated for general applicability; therefore their 
applicability to sections other than those expressly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Judge Stapleton's elaboration in his concurrence on the differences 
between the Poff dissent and Chatman is instructive. 
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referenced must be determined on a case by case basis." 
USSG S 1B1.1, comment. (n.2). USSG S 4B1.2's "crime of 
violence" definition is therefore one of limited applicability. 
 
Fourth, USSG S 4B1.1 and USSG S 5K2.13 address 
different policy concerns. While USSG S 4B1.1 increases 
sentences for persons whose criminal records suggest a 
propensity to commit violent crimes, USSG S 5K2.13 
encourages more lenient treatment for persons who are not 
actually dangerous but whose reduced mental capacity 
contributed to the commission of a crime. 
 
In short, the choice of different phrasing, the absence of 
a cross-reference, and the explicit definitions attached to 
one section but not the other, all suggest that the 
Sentencing Commission did not intend to import the "crime 
of violence" definition from USSG S 4B1.2 to USSG 
S 5K2.13. Of course the Sentencing Commission could 
adopt a definition of "non-violent offense" which, if in 
conformity with the statute, could be binding on the district 
judge. Or it could delete the reference to "non-violent 
offense" in USSG S 5K2.13. But in the absence of some 
direction from the Sentencing Commission, we are 
unwilling to apply the "crime of violence" definition 
articulated in USSG S 4B1.2 to USSG S 5K2.13. 
 
Although we find convincing many of the arguments put 
forth in the Poff dissent, Chatman, and Weddle, we take a 
somewhat different view of the applicable standard. Those 
cases direct the district judge applying USSG S 5K2.13 to 
make a fact specific inquiry whether a defendant has 
committed a "non-violent offense." The question remains 
whether there is anything that constrains the district 
court's review of the "facts and circumstances" of the crime. 
 
D. 
 
In modern criminology, there has always been a 
distinction between culpability and sanction, between 
finding guilt and imposing sentence. Until recently, 
sentencing had been the courts' unique role. Before the 
advent of mandatory sentences and sentencing guidelines, 
courts routinely looked to all the facts and circumstances 
before passing sentence. Indeed, the severe effects of a 
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"borderline" conviction were often mitigated by a lenient 
sentence. 
 
But the Sentencing Reform Act brought with it significant 
changes. Since adoption of the sentencing guidelines, the 
fact of conviction, whatever the nature or character of the 
crime, has carried concrete and sometimes rigid sanctions 
(even un-convicted conduct can now be punished as 
relevant conduct). Through the means of downward 
departures (which is what concerns us here), the 
Sentencing Commission has attempted to ameliorate the 
consequences of certain kinds of convictions. This is 
difficult to do, especially when it involves pinpointing 
behavior in an almost infinite spectrum and affixing 
quantitative values. But whether the existing guideline 
structure can permit the Sentencing Commission to fashion 
a just downward departure in every case where it is 
appropriate, it is clear that the Sentencing Commission did 
not intend to allow departures in USSG S 5K2.13 for 
offenders who may be dangerous to the public. 
 
We agree that the district court should look at all the 
facts and circumstances of the crime, but it should do so 
within the context of the Sentencing Reform Act and the 
underlying statute defining criminal culpability. Because 
the sentencing guidelines offer no "guidance" on how to 
define "non-violent offense," we are led back to the enabling 
statute, the Sentencing Reform Act,12 and its articulation of 
the factors to be considered in imposing sentence.13 Of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b) provides, in part: 
 
        (b) Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence  . . . . In 
       the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall 
       impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes 
       set forth in subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an applicable 
       sentencing guideline in the case of an offense other than a petty 
       offense, the court shall also have due regard for the relationship 
of 
       the sentence imposed to the sentences prescribed by guidelines 
       applicable to similar offenses and offenders, and to the applicable 
       policy statements of the Sentencing Commission. 
 
18 U.S.C.A. S 3553(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997). 
 
13. The general factors articulated in 18 U.S.C.S 3553(a) provide, in 
part: 
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particular interest here, when trying to define "non-violent 
offense," is the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to protect the public, and to 
provide just punishment. 
 
To assess the seriousness of the offense,14 we look to the 
elements of the crime and the surrounding conduct. Bank 
robbery, the underlying offense here, consists of taking, or 
attempting to take, anything of value, by force and violence, 
by intimidation, or by extortion.15 The requirement that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       (a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.-- The court 
       shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, 
       to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this 
       subsection. 
 
* * * 
 
       (2) the need for the sentence imposed -- 
 
        (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect 
       for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
 
        (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
 
        (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; 
       and 
 
        (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 
       vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
       treatment in the most effective manner; 
 
18 U.S.C.A. S 3553(a). It appears that, in a specific sense, these factors 
have been largely supplanted by the sentencing guidelines. 
 
14. " `Offense' means the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct 
under S 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) unless a different meaning is specified 
or is otherwise clear from the context." USSGS 1B1.1, comment. (n.1). 
 
15. 18 U.S.C.A. S 2113(a) provides: 
 
       [w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or 
       attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or 
obtains 
       or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any 
       other thing of value belonging to, or in the case, custody, 
control, 
       management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any 
       savings and loan association. 
 
The second paragraph of this section, which is not applicable here, 
provides: 
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property be taken either "by force and violence" or "by 
intimidation" requires proof of force or threat of force as an 
element of the offense. Maddalena, 893 F.2d at 819. The 
term "intimidation" means to make fearful or put into fear. 
McCarty, 36 F.3d at 1357. In determining whether 
intimidation is present, the question is whether an ordinary 
person in the victim's position reasonably could infer a 
threat of bodily harm from the defendant's acts. Id. "The 
term `extortion' as used in 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) means 
obtaining property from another person, without the other 
person's consent, induced by the wrongful use of actual or 
threatened force, violence, or fear."16  If there is no taking by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or 
       any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or 
       in part as a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan 
       association, with the intent to commit in such bank, credit union, 
       or in such savings and loan association, or building, or part 
thereof, 
       so used, any felony affecting such bank, credit union, or such 
       savings and loan association and in violation of any statute of the 
       United States, or any larceny -- 
 
       Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty 
       years, or both. 
 
Id. 
 
16. H.Rep. No. 99-797, at 33, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6138, 6156. 
See also 18 U.S.C.A. S 1951(b)(2) (West 1984 & Supp. 1997) (the Hobbs 
Act)(extortion means "obtaining of property from another, with [their] 
consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, 
or fear, or under color of official right"). Both the Hobbs Act and 18 
U.S.C. S 2113(a) punish extortion. The provisions, however, focus on 
different concerns. See United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 
983 (2d Cir. 1990) ("In enacting S 1951, Congress' principal concern was 
protecting the flow of interstate commerce . . . . In contrast, in 
enacting 
S 2113, Congress's principal concern was tofind a means of protecting 
the institutions in which the Federal Government is interested") 
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991). 
 
In 1986 Congress amended S 2113(a) to expressly cover extortion 
directed at federal insured banks and make it the"exclusive provision for 
prosecuting bank extortion." H.Rep. No. 99-797, at 33, reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6138, 6156. The Committee Report stated that extortionate 
conduct had been prosecutable under either the [18 U.S.C. S 2113(a)] or 
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extortion, actual or threatened force, violence, or 
intimidation, there can be no valid conviction for bank 
robbery under 18 U.S.C. S 2113(a). In that case, there could 
be a conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 2113(b) (theft without 
threat of force). It would seem, therefore, that with bank 
robbery convictions under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 
S 2113(a), a defendant could not qualify for a departure 
under USSG S 5K2.13 as presently written. Of course, this 
refers to convictions only under the first paragraph of 
S 2113(a). The second paragraph of that section describes 
entering, or attempting to enter, a bank with intent to 
commit a felony therein. The second paragraph does not 
necessarily describe a crime of violence; that would depend 
on the felony.17 
 
There also may be other cases of bank robbery where 
USSG S 5K2.13 might apply. Conceivably, a defendant 
could commit a bank robbery by extortion under the Hobbs 
Act (18 U.S.C. S 1951(b)(2)) involving neither intimidation, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the Hobbs Act, and concluded that clarification as to which should be 
the applicable statute is desirable. Id. 
 
The guidelines make a distinction between "Extortion by Force or 
Threat of Injury or Serious Damage," USSG S 2B3.2, and "Blackmail and 
Similar Forms of Extortion," USSG S 2B3.3. The latter applies "only to 
blackmail and similar forms of extortion where there clearly is no threat 
of violence to person or property." USSG S 2B3.3, comment. (n.1). 
 
17. See United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749, 752 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990) 
("The second paragraph [of S 2113(a)] describes an entry or attempt to 
enter a bank with intent to commit a felony in it. The second paragraph 
does not describe a crime of violence"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 986 
(1990); 
United States v. Pick, 724 F.2d 297, 301 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Section 2113(a) 
prohibits entry of a bank with the intent to commit `any' felony 
[including mail fraud] and in no way limits its application to robberies, 
burglaries, or felonies not covered under other sections of the Act"); 
United States v. Brown, 547 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1976) (Felonious intent 
is not "made part of the crimes of taking by force and violence or by 
intimidation ([subsection] a-first paragraph)") (emphasis supplied), cert. 
denied, 431 U.S. 905 (1977); Williams v. United States, 301 F.2d 276, 
277 (7th Cir. 1962) (With respect to the second paragraph of S 2113(a), 
the "intent of Congress was to make any unlawful entry or attempted 
entry of a bank, regardless of its current state of habitation, a federal 
crime"). 
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actual violence, nor the threat of violence. Extortion by an 
official acting under color of right could be a "non-violent 
offense." See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 951 F.2d 316, 
318 (11th Cir. 1992) ("In a Hobbs Act prosecution of a 
public official, the government need not prove actual or 
threatened force, violence or duress because `the coercive 
element is supplied by the existence of the public office 
itself ' ") (citing United States v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 124 
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981)); United 
States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 330 (4th Cir. 1982) (Fear of 
economic harm will sustain a Hobbs Act violation. "The fear 
need not be the consequence of a direct or implicit threat 
by the defendant, and the government's burden of proof is 
satisfied if it shows that the victim feared economic harm 
and that the circumstances surrounding the alleged 
extortionate conduct rendered that fear reasonable") 
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983); United 
States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 425 (3d Cir. 1979) ("where 
extortion under color of official right is charged, one need 
not prove that the payment was obtained by force, fear or 
duress"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043 (1980). 
 
We believe that departures under USSG S 5K2.13 exclude 
conduct that involves actual force, threat of force, or 
intimidation, the latter two measured under a reasonable 
person standard. Therefore, "non-violent offenses" under 
USSG S 5K2.13 are those which do not involve a reasonable 
perception that force against persons may be used in 
committing the offense. 
 
Although conviction and sentencing are separate, 
sentencing has always been tied to the crime of conviction 
at least in the sense that they must be congruent. If the 
elements of the crime require a finding of violent conduct, 
then a valid conviction could hardly permit a sentence 
based on a finding of non-violent conduct. So long as the 
bank robbery victim has been threatened with harm, and is 
seen to have been threatened under an objective standard 
(reasonable person), the defendant cannot be found to have 
acted in a non-violent manner. 
 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that conduct may be 
violent (as defined by statute) but still warrant a more 
lenient sentence if committed by a defendant with 
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diminished mental capacity who is not dangerous to the 
public (as defined by his criminal history). This may be so, 
especially where violence is threatened, but the threat is 
not realized. To put it differently, does the term "non-violent 
offense" in USSG S 5K2.13 include acts resulting in valid 
convictions under 18 U.S.C.A. S 2113(a) where the threat of 
violence was never carried out? Under the current 
guidelines, we think the answer is yes for the reasons 
expressed by us and by Judge Stapleton in his thoughtful 
concurrence.18 
 
E. 
 
In this case, Askari was found guilty of bank robbery. 
The bank teller, Ellen Ishizaki, described the robbery as 
follows: 
 
       The fellow came up to the middle window and he asked 
       us to put our money up on the counter . . . . [H]e said 
       the same thing again. At that point I pressed the alarm 
       button, the silent alarm. He then pushed his way over 
       to my window, asked me for the money and then he, 
       you know, and I still hesitated and then finally he told 
       me I had three seconds to give him my money. And 
       then I gave him my money . . . . [I was scared] 
       [b]ecause he had his hand in his shirt and I didn't 
       know if he was going to pull a gun out on me or a knife 
       or, you know, at that point I was, you know, scared. 
 
(App. at 14a). The bank teller, when told that she had three 
seconds to hand over the money by someone who had his 
hand in his shirt, was fearful. An ordinary person in the 
bank teller's position reasonably could infer a threat of 
bodily harm from Askari's demand and actions. Looking at 
the elements of the crime and the surrounding conduct, 
Askari did not commit a "non-violent offense." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Nevertheless, there appears to be no impediment to the Sentencing 
Commission's drawing this distinction. For purposes of sentencing, the 
Sentencing Commission could delete the "non-violent offense" 
requirement from USSG S 5K2.13. Or, it could condition application of 
USSG S 5K2.13 on an unrealized threat of violence. But under the 
current guidelines, we believe no distinction presently exists. 
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Askari was sentenced as a "career offender." (Presentence 
Report P 33). USSG S 5K2.13 applies only if Askari's 
criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration 
to protect the public. Even if this bank robbery were 
classified as a non-violent offense, Askari may still not have 
qualified for a USSG S 5K2.13 departure. Askari's criminal 
history contains other violent crimes, including two armed 
bank robberies, suggesting his incapacitation may be 
necessary. (See App. at 56a (district court noting "[t]he 
Defendant . . . has a long history of crime, including violent 
crime . . . . the criminal history score in this case takes him 
pretty much to the top of the range"); Presentence Report 
PP 18-32).19 
 
F. 
 
Accordingly, we hold Askari could not qualify for 
departure under USSG S 5K2.13 because he did not commit 
a "non-violent offense." 
 
We will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Askari's criminal convictions include (1) bank robbery at gunpoint 
(1974); (2) robbery at gunpoint and violation of the Uniform Firearms Act 
(1980); (3) theft (1982); and (4) possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon (1983). (See Presentence Report PP 29-32). 
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